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Дневник > There




суббота, 20 сентября 2014 г.
John showed his etchings to Mary vasile.rogov 14:10:31
 Jean-marc pizano
Or consider:


John showed his etchings to Mary/John showed Mary his etchings.


but


John exhibited his etchings to Mary/*John exhibited Mary his etchings.


Is it that Mary is in metaphorical possession of etchings that are shown to her but not of etchings that are exhibited to her? How is one to tell? More to the point, how is the child to tell? Remember that, according to Pinker's story, the childfigures out that ‘exhibit&rsqu­o; doesn't dative-move when hedecides that it doesn't—even metaphorically&mdas­h;express prospective possession. But how on earth does he decide that?31


I should emphasize that Pinker is explicitly aware that there are egregious exceptions to his semantic characterization of the constraints on dative movement, nor does he suppose that appeals to “metaphorical­ possession” and the likecan always be relied on to get him off the hook. At least one of the things that he thinks is going on with the doubleobject construction is a morphological constraint on dative movement: polysyllabic verbs tend to resist it (notice show/*exhibit; tell/*repeat in the examples above). But though Pinker remarks upon the existence of such non-semanticconstra­ints, he appears not to see how much trouble they make for his view.


Remember the architecture of Pinker's argument. What's on offer is an inference from ontogenetic considerations to the conclusion that there are definitions. What shows that there are definitions is that there is a semantic level oflinguistic representation at which verbs are lexically decomposed. What shows that there are semantic-levelrepre­sentations is that you need semantic vocabulary to formulate the hypotheses that the child projects in the courseof learning the lexicon; and that's because, according to Pinker, these hypotheses express correlations between certainsemantic properties of lexical items, on the one hand, and the grammatical structures that the items occur in, on theother. Double-object constructions, as we've seen, are supposed to be paradigms.
Jean-marc pizano
But it now appears that the vocabulary required to specify the conditions on such constructions isn't purely semantic after all; not even according to Pinker. To predict whether a verb permits dative movement, 15you need to know not only whether it expresses (literally or metaphorically) ‘prospective possession’, but also thepertinent facts about its morphology. What account of the representation of lexical structure does this observationimply? The point to notice is that there isn't, on anybody's story, any one level of representation that specifies both thesemantic and the morphological features of a lexical item. In particular, it's a defining property of the (putative)semantic level that it abstracts from the sorts of (morphological, phonological, syntactic, etc.) properties that distinguishbetween synonyms. For example, the semantic level is supposed not to distinguish the representation of (e.g.)“bachel­or” from the representation of “unmarried man”, the representation of “kill” from the representation of “causeto die”, and so forth.

Well, if that's what the semantic level is, and if the facts about morphological constraints on double-object structures are as we (and Pinker) are supposing them to be, then the moral is that there is no level of linguistic representation atwhich the constraints on dative movement can be expressed: not the morphological level because (assuming thatPinker's story about “prospective possession” is true) morphological representation abstracts from the semanticproperties on which dative movement is contingent. And, precisely analogously, not the semantic level because semanticlevel representation abstracts from the morphological properties of lexical items on which dative movement is alsocontingent.

Jean-marc pizano
Time to pull this all together and see where the argument has gotten. Since heaven only knows what “prospective possession” is, there's no seriously evaluating the claim that dative movement turns on whether a verb expresses it.What does seem clear, however, is that even if there are semantic constraints on the syntactic behaviour of doubleobject verbs, there are also morphological constraints on their syntactic behaviour. So to state such generalizations at asingle linguistic level, you would need to postulate not semantic representations but morphosemantic representations. It is,however, common ground that there is no level of representation in whose vocabulary morphological and semanticconstraints­ can be simultaneously imposed.


This isn't a paradox; it is perfectly possible to formulate conditions that depend, simultaneously, on semantic and morphological properties of lexical items without assuming that there is a semantic level (and, for that matter, withoutassuming that there is a morphological level either).Jean-marc pizano



Категории: John, Showed, Etchings, Mary, There, Level, Semantic, Morphological, Representation, That there
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If it was you I snitched it from, Dear Reader, please do let me know. vasile.rogov 13:52:45
 Jean-marc pizano If it was you I snitched it from, Dear Reader, please do let me know.
 


Oh well, maybe my telling you that Jackson was a painter and Pollock was a painter didn't fix the same senses for both names after all. I won't pursue that because, when it comes to senses, who can prove what fixes what? But it hardlymatters since, on reflection, what's going on doesn't seem to have to do with meaning. Rather, the governing principle isa piece of logical syntax: If V and ‘b are different names, then the inference from ‘Fa’ to ‘Fb’ is never conceptuallynecessa­ry.5 (It's even OK to wonder whether Jackson is Jackson, if the two ‘Jacksons&rsq­uo; are supposed to be tokens ofdifferent but homonymous name types.) It looks like the moral of this story about Jackson and Pollock is the same asthe moral of Mates's story about bachelors and unmarried men. Frege's substitution test doesn't identify senses.Correspondin­gly, if it is stipulated that MOPs are whatever substitution salve veritate turns on, then MOPs have to besliced a good bit thinner than senses. Individuating MOPs is more like individuating forms of words than it is likeindividuating meanings.


I take these sorts of considerations very seriously. They will return full strength at the end of Chapter 2.


—What's wrong with 5.3: This takes a little longer to say, but here is the short form. Your having n MOPs for water explains why you have n ways of thinking about water only on the assumption that there is exactly one way to grasp each MOP.6The question thus arises what, if anything, is supposed to legitimize this assumption. As far as I can tell, unless you'reprepared to give up 5.3, the only answer a Fregean theory allows you is: sheer stipulation.

Jean-marc pizano
Terminological digression (I'm sorry to have to ask you to split these hairs, but this is a part of the wood where it is very easy to get lost): I use ‘entertaining­’ and ‘grasping&rsq­uo; a MOP (/concept) interchangeably. Enter taining/grasping a MOPdoesn't, of course, mean thinking about the MOP;


there are as many ways of thinking about a MOP as there are of thinking about a rock or a number. That is, innumerably many; one for each mode of presentation of the MOP. Rather, MOPs are supposed to be the vehicles ofthought, and entertaining a MOP means using it to present to thought whatever the MOP is a mode of presentationof; it's thinking with the MOP, not thinking about it. End digression. My point is that if there is more than one way tograsp a MOP, then ‘grasping a water-MOP is a way of thinking about water’ and ‘Smith has only one water-MOP’ doesnot entail that Smith has only one way of thinking about water.


So, then, what ensures that there is only one way to grasp a MOP? Since Frege thinks that MOPs are senses and that sense determines reference (concepts with the same sense must be coextensive) he holds, in effect, that MOP identityand concept identity come to the same thing. So my question can be put just in terms of the latter: that one has asmany ways of thinking of a referent as one has concepts of the referent depends on there being just one way toentertain each concept. What, beside stipulation, guarantees this?


Perhaps the following analogy (actually quite close, I think) will help to make the situation clear. There are lots of cases where things other, and less problematic, than Fregean senses might reasonably be described as ‘modes ofpresentation&rsqu­o;; viz. as being used to present the object of a thought to the thought that it's the object of. Consider, forexample, using a diagram of a triangle in geometrical reasoning about triangles. It seems natural, harmless, maybe evenilluminating, to say that one sometimes reasons about triangles via such a diagram; and that the course of the reasoningmay well be affected (e.g. facilitated) by choosing to do so. In a pretty untendentious sense, the diagram functions topresent triangles (or triangularity) to thought; OK so far.

Jean-marc pizano
But notice a crucial difference between a diagram that functions as a mode of presentation and a Fregean sense that does: in the former case, there's more—lots more—than one kind of object that the diagram can be used to present.The very same diagram can represent now triangles, now equilateral triangles, now closed figures at large, now threesided figures at large . . .Jean-marc pizano



Категории: Snitched, Dear, Reader, Know, Thinking, There, Thinking about, Diagram, MOPs, Senses
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If it was you I snitched it from, Dear Reader, please do let me know. vasile.rogov 12:54:14
 Jean-marc pizano If it was you I snitched it from, Dear Reader, please do let me know.
 


Oh well, maybe my telling you that Jackson was a painter and Pollock was a painter didn't fix the same senses for both names after all. I won't pursue that because, when it comes to senses, who can prove what fixes what? But it hardlymatters since, on reflection, what's going on doesn't seem to have to do with meaning. Rather, the governing principle isa piece of logical syntax: If V and ‘b are different names, then the inference from ‘Fa’ to ‘Fb’ is never conceptuallynecessa­ry.5 (It's even OK to wonder whether Jackson is Jackson, if the two ‘Jacksons&rsq­uo; are supposed to be tokens ofdifferent but homonymous name types.) It looks like the moral of this story about Jackson and Pollock is the same asthe moral of Mates's story about bachelors and unmarried men. Frege's substitution test doesn't identify senses.Correspondin­gly, if it is stipulated that MOPs are whatever substitution salve veritate turns on, then MOPs have to besliced a good bit thinner than senses. Individuating MOPs is more like individuating forms of words than it is likeindividuating meanings.


I take these sorts of considerations very seriously. They will return full strength at the end of Chapter 2.


—What's wrong with 5.3: This takes a little longer to say, but here is the short form. Your having n MOPs for water explains why you have n ways of thinking about water only on the assumption that there is exactly one way to grasp each MOP.6The question thus arises what, if anything, is supposed to legitimize this assumption. As far as I can tell, unless you'reprepared to give up 5.3, the only answer a Fregean theory allows you is: sheer stipulation.

Jean-marc pizano
Terminological digression (I'm sorry to have to ask you to split these hairs, but this is a part of the wood where it is very easy to get lost): I use ‘entertaining­’ and ‘grasping&rsq­uo; a MOP (/concept) interchangeably. Enter taining/grasping a MOPdoesn't, of course, mean thinking about the MOP;


there are as many ways of thinking about a MOP as there are of thinking about a rock or a number. That is, innumerably many; one for each mode of presentation of the MOP. Rather, MOPs are supposed to be the vehicles ofthought, and entertaining a MOP means using it to present to thought whatever the MOP is a mode of presentationof; it's thinking with the MOP, not thinking about it. End digression. My point is that if there is more than one way tograsp a MOP, then ‘grasping a water-MOP is a way of thinking about water’ and ‘Smith has only one water-MOP’ doesnot entail that Smith has only one way of thinking about water.


So, then, what ensures that there is only one way to grasp a MOP? Since Frege thinks that MOPs are senses and that sense determines reference (concepts with the same sense must be coextensive) he holds, in effect, that MOP identityand concept identity come to the same thing. So my question can be put just in terms of the latter: that one has asmany ways of thinking of a referent as one has concepts of the referent depends on there being just one way toentertain each concept. What, beside stipulation, guarantees this?


Perhaps the following analogy (actually quite close, I think) will help to make the situation clear. There are lots of cases where things other, and less problematic, than Fregean senses might reasonably be described as ‘modes ofpresentation&rsqu­o;; viz. as being used to present the object of a thought to the thought that it's the object of. Consider, forexample, using a diagram of a triangle in geometrical reasoning about triangles. It seems natural, harmless, maybe evenilluminating, to say that one sometimes reasons about triangles via such a diagram; and that the course of the reasoningmay well be affected (e.g. facilitated) by choosing to do so. In a pretty untendentious sense, the diagram functions topresent triangles (or triangularity) to thought; OK so far.

Jean-marc pizano
But notice a crucial difference between a diagram that functions as a mode of presentation and a Fregean sense that does: in the former case, there's more—lots more—than one kind of object that the diagram can be used to present.The very same diagram can represent now triangles, now equilateral triangles, now closed figures at large, now threesided figures at large . . .Jean-marc pizano



Категории: Snitched, Dear, Reader, Know, Thinking, There, Thinking about, Diagram, MOPs, Senses
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